given to objects by the mind. But it is more to our present purpose to remark, that Kant acts most arbitrarily in supposing that time and space are the only "forms" of our primitive knowledge; we are glad that Mr. M. has added "personality." We only take an advance in the same direction when we place Power among our intuitive convictions; only we represent it not as a "form" but a cognition, which, like personality, is "undefinable, but it is because it is superior to definition." We can thus specify something more as being in cause than mere invariable antecedence,—we can specify substance intuitively known as possessing potency. Our appeal is again to consciousness, which says that we cannot know either self or body except as possessing agency, property, power.

III. Mr. Mansel in first edition represented us as standing up for a "positive conception of infinity." This statement was handsomely withdrawn in the third edition (p. 334), where he says our view is not inconsistent with that of Hamilton. "We have nowhere said that we have a *positive conception* of infinity. On the contrary, we have said (p. 141) that the "finite cannot comprehend the infinite;" and (p. 12) we speak "of the mind's intuitive *belief in* an infinite of which it cannot form an adequate *conception*." At the same time we maintain that the mind has an intuitive conviction in regard to infinity, which it is the business of inductive mental science to unfold and express; and that when this is done there will be found more than a mere negative impotence of conception. We are glad to find Mr. M. affirming that the Infinite is an "object of belief* (p. xiv.); that through our positive religious consciousness of the finite there runs "the accompanying conviction that the Infinite does exist" (p. 120); that the "conviction *that* an Infinite Being exists seems forced upon us by the manifest incompleteness of our finite knowledge" (p. 179); that "religion must rest on a belief in the Infinite" (p. 182); and that "we are compelled to believe there was a time before as well as after the creation of the world" (p. 209). Sir W. Hamilton too says—"By a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality" (Discussions, p. 15). We have always felt that there is something unsatisfactory in thus driving us out of knowledge and leaving us in "faith" or "belief," while no account is given of the nature or tests or limits of this "faith" or "belief." Surely our faiths (or our revelations or inspirations) are as much a part of our constitution as our cognitions; nay, our cognitions run almost insensibly into beliefs. It is the duty of the psychologist to unfold our intuitive beliefs as well as our intuitive cognitions or conceptions, and the former are quite as liable as the latter to be misunderstood and misapplied. Surely every man is not to be at liberty to appeal to faith without first inducting it and determining its precise nature. We have ventured to express what we believe to be

the mind's conviction in regard to the infinite (see p. 534). It is a belief intuitive, necessary, and in a sense universal. But it must be a belief in something apprehended or conceived, otherwise it is a belief in *nothing*. We look upon it as belief, in regard to certain things such as space and time, that to whatever point we might go in conception there must be space and time beyond it. It is not an adequate conception of infinity, but still the belief is positive, and there is the positive mental conception or apprehension of an object believed in.

(Seventh Edition.) We think it better to hand over the controversy which Mr. Mansel has started (Prolegomena Logica, 2d ed.) regarding the freedom of the will, and all farther discussions on Fundamental Principles generally, to the